Computing on Masked Data to improve the Security of Big Data by Gadepally, Vijay et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
01
28
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 A
pr
 20
15
COMPUTING ON MASKED DATA TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF BIG DATA
Vijay Gadepally, B. Hancock and B. Kaiser, J. Kepner, P. Michaleas, M. Varia, A. Yerukhimovich
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA 02420
{vijayg, braden.hancock, benjamin.kaiser, kepner, pmichaleas, mayank.varia, arkady}@ ll.mit.edu
ABSTRACT
Organizations that make use of large quantities of information
require the ability to store and process data from central loca-
tions so that the product can be shared or distributed across
a heterogeneous group of users. However, recent events un-
derscore the need for improving the security of data stored
in such untrusted servers or databases. Advances in cryp-
tographic techniques and database technologies provide the
necessary security functionality but rely on a computational
model in which the cloud is used solely for storage and re-
trieval. Much of big data computation and analytics make use
of signal processing fundamentals for computation. As the
trend of moving data storage and computation to the cloud
increases, homeland security missions should understand the
impact of security on key signal processing kernels such as
correlation or thresholding. In this article, we propose a tool
called Computing on Masked Data (CMD), which combines
advances in database technologies and cryptographic tools to
provide a low overhead mechanism to offload certain math-
ematical operations securely to the cloud. This article de-
scribes the design and development of the CMD tool.
Index Terms— Big Data; Accumulo; D4M; Encryption;
Information Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent events, such as [1], highlight the growing need to im-
prove the security of big data stored in the cloud. The tradi-
tional challenges associated with big data are often referred
to as the 3 Vs of big data: Volume, Velocity and Variety. The
sensitivity of data being processed in the cloud is increasing,
and it is possible to make use of cryptographic advances to se-
cure processing in the cloud to address a growing 4th V of big
data - Veracity (the closest word to security that starts with a
’V’). Unfortunately, the volume, velocity and variety proper-
ties of big data systems challenge various system components
and are often used to justify ignoring this increasingly im-
portant factor. In a common computing infrastructure where
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sensor data is fed into a shared computing cloud to be used
by authorized users, the goal is to determine techniques that
allow the potentially untrusted computing cloud to store and
perform computation directly on encrypted or masked data.
Large heterogenous organizations, such as the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, have a particular need for mak-
ing use of the cloud. Key features such as resource pooling,
rapid elasticity and on-demand self-service [2] provide the
ability for diverse organizations to share information effi-
ciently and easily. However, these advantages also create a
single point where adversaries may try to attack the confiden-
tiality, integrity and/or availability of sensitive information
stored or being processed. As a specific example, a recent re-
port by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) looked
at the viability of making use of cybersecurity insurance
(http://www.dhs.gov/publication/cybersecurity-insurance).
One of the requirements for evaluating the applicability of
such a system will be in the ability to track cyber incident
reports in a central location such as a commercial cloud
offering. This data stored in the repository may provide
adversaries with information that could be used to reverse
engineer the details of a cyber security breach [3]. In this
example and many more, cryptographic protections can be
used to mitigate the risks of data being stored and processed
in the cloud.
Prior work has looked at various techniques to improve
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of big data sys-
tems and an overview is provided in [4]. There are many ex-
isting cryptographic tools capable of performing some level
of computation on encrypted data. One of these is Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption (FHE), first introduced in 2009 [5].
This method allows arbitrary analytic computations to be per-
formed on encrypted data while maintaining a strong security
guarantee called “semantic security” (also referred to as ran-
domized encryption and is denoted as RND). The current state
of the art implementations of this scheme [6, 7] have a min-
imum computational overhead of 105, which removes them
from consideration for any practical big data system. Secure
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) techniques [8, 9] are another
possibility with semantic security guarantees, but these tech-
niques also currently experience excessive overhead and re-
quire large amounts of customization for a given application
and threat model.
An alternative solution is to make use of more relaxed
forms of encryption that reveal small amounts of information,
as first described for the database setting in [10]. In such a
system, one may make use of the deterministic encryption
method (DET), which encrypts any plaintext and key to a sin-
gle ciphertext thereby allowing for fast equality calculations
to be performed on encrypted data (a property very desirable
for database applications). Other relaxed forms of encryption,
such as Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) which preserves
the relative order of all inputs, provide high functionality in
return for relaxed security guarantees. In this article we pro-
pose the Computing on Masked Data (CMD) [11] system that
uses a combination of RND, DET, and OPE modes to mask
sensitive data, insert into a NoSQL database and perform sim-
ple computation on the masked data. Further, for many situa-
tions, data integrity (not necessarily confidentiality) is a large
concern and we provide a 4th masking level - Authentication
(AUT). The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the proposed tool. Section 3 describes the im-
plementation of the CMD tool. Section 4 describes how CMD
can be applied to simple signal processing kernels which are
important to analytic developers. Section 5 discusses the per-
formance of CMD on these signal processing kernels. Finally,
in Section 6 we discuss potential CMD applications and con-
clude.
2. COMPUTING ON MASKED DATA
Associative Arrays, the data type provided by the Dynamic
Distributed Dimensional Data Model (D4M) [12], are used
as the base schema to represent unstructured large data sets.
The D4M schema encapsulates all semantic information of
a dataset into the rows and columns of a sparse associative
array. We make use of this property to use various different
encryption techniques to mask the rows and columns depend-
ing on required functionality. An overview of the schema is
described in Figure 1.
Associative array rows, columns and values are masked
through the CMD mask function, which encrypts entities
of the sparse associative array. For example, if one intends
to perform range operations on columns, columns may be
masked using OPE. Associative arrays support the full range
of linear algebra operations such as addition, multiplication,
etc. A more thorough description of the CMD system is
provided in [11].
3. CMD IMPLEMENTATION
A prototype of CMD has been developed as a MATLAB/GNU
Octave toolbox. The current version of CMD allows a user
to select among four masking levels: RND, DET, OPE and
AUT. A combination of masking levels can be used across the
rows, columns and values of the associative array represen-
tation. Selecting a masking level depends upon the desired
Fig. 1: Masking illustrative network data records. Dense data
is made sparse using the D4M schema and moves semantic
information to the rows and columns of sparse assosciative
arrays. The sparse table is then masked using a variety of
encryption schemes depending on the desired functionality.
The terms DET, OPE and RND are described in Section 3.
Masking
Level
Information Leaked Database Func-
tionality
RND Hides all information
about data
Decrypt only
DET Reveals equality patterns Query plaintext
OPE Reveals equality patterns
and order
Plaintext range
query
AUT Reveals everything but
protects data integrity
All queries
Table 1: Summary of security provided and database func-
tionality for CMD masking levels
functionality. A summary of database (DB) functionality
and security afforded for different masking levels is provided
in Table 1. The implementation of each of the encryption
techniques is described below.
3.1. Semantically Secure Encryption - RND
The CMD implementation of RND uses the AES-256 block
cipher found in OpenSSL (www.openssl.org) in the Cipher
Block Chaining or Galois Counter Mode. The cryptographic
key is derived from a user-provided password and an 8-byte
salt using 1000 rounds of the derived key generation loop.
Each ciphertext has a minimum length of one AES block and
is derived from both the cryptographic key and an Initializa-
tion Vector (IV) of 16 bytes. The IV is generated using the
OpenSSL command RAND bytes, which generates an arbi-
Fig. 2: Plaintext data is masked using a combination of possi-
ble modes. Masked data is then encoded for storage purposes.
Accessing the data involves first decoding the stored masktext
and unmasking.
trary length string of cryptographically strong pseudo-random
bytes. This step ensures that each masking of the same plain-
text will yield a different ciphertext, thereby protecting equal-
ity information. To simplify string handling, ciphertexts are
converted into printable characters using Base64 encoding.
An overview of the process is described in Figure 2.
3.2. Deterministic Encryption - DET
The implementation of DET is identical to that of RND ex-
cept for the way that the IV is generated for each message. To
leak only equality information and nothing more, DET mask-
ing requires that each message uses an IV that is unique to
that message and deterministically obtained. This is achieved
in CMD by using the SHA-1 hash of each message as its own
IV, truncated to 16 bytes. The OpenSSL SHA-256 imple-
mentation may be substituted for SHA-1 if more security is
desired, but this comes with an approximate 40% increase in
computation time compared to using the SHA-1 hash (which
can perform approximately 1.7x106 hashes/second).
3.3. Order Preserving Encryption - OPE
For the OPE masking level, a mutable scheme called mOPE,
initially proposed in [13], was adopted. The mOPE model
consists of a trusted client and an untrusted server that inter-
act with each other. The untrusted server is never given access
to any plaintext values or the user password, and the trusted
client is never required to store or analyze the entire data set at
once. The data are stored on the server in a binary search tree
as ciphertexts (obtained through DET encryption operations
on the client). Because ciphertexts do not leak order informa-
tion, the server must communicate with the client through an
interactive session to determine the correct location in the bi-
nary search tree for each ciphertext. Starting at the root of the
tree, the server sends the client the ciphertext of the current
node. The client decrypts the ciphertext at that node, com-
pares it to the plaintext being inserted, and returns a 0 (left) if
the plaintext is less than the value at that node or a 1 (right)
if the plaintext is greater. The new current node is then re-
turned, and the process repeats. When the exact location of
the plaintext to be inserted has been found, the client sends
the server the ciphertext of that value along with a command
to insert it there in the tree. The OPE ordertext representa-
tion of a given plaintext is simply the path to its ciphertext
in the binary search tree, concatenated with padding of a 1
and a sufficient number of 0s to make all ordertexts the same
size. We once again chose to use a default size of 16 bytes
(thereby allowing for 216 entries if 0s and 1s are stored as
strings or 2128 entries if the path is stored as bits). Figure 3
describes a sample OPE Tree and corresponding OPE Table,
which indicates the ordertext value for each ciphertext in the
tree. Querying for data (or a range of data) occurs by deter-
mining the position of the masked data.
3.4. Authentication mode - AUT
The fourth supported operation available in CMD is AUT
which stands for Authentication. This operation does not
actually mask the data at all and plaintext is left as plain-
text. Prepended to the plaintext, however, is a hash-based
message authentication code (HMAC). Here too, we prefer
to use SHA-1 for performance reasons. When a given mes-
sage is unmasked with AUT, the HMAC that is stored with
the plaintext can be extracted and compared against a new
HMAC of the plaintext message and key. If the two are equal,
the user can have confidence that the original message has
not been modified since it was first stored as generating the
same HMAC requires knowledge of the key. While the AUT
mode does not ensure data confidentiality, it does ensure data
integrity.
4. SIGNAL PROCESSING WITH CMD
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of CMD on
some basic signal processing kernels. Given the relationship
between the associative array representation and graphs, we
pay particular attention to correlation and thresholding, which
can be used as building blocks to construct a variety of linear
algebra and signal processing algorithms.
Correlation provides a measure of the statistical relation-
ship between two entities. Calculating the correlation of
two associative arrays involves transposing and multiplying.
Since CMD preserves the associative array structure of big
data, we can perform masked correlation by multiplying two
Fig. 3: Overview of the data structures in the mOPE scheme. Each node in the OPE tree contains a ciphertext. The plaintext
value of each ciphertext is shown here in gray blocks for illustration purposes and are not stored in the tree. The ordertext value
corresponding to each ciphertext comes from following the path to each ciphertext from the root of the tree. Ciphertext-ordertext
pairs are stored in a database to enable fast lookup. Figure concept from [13].
masked arrays which are masked using any of the supported
masking modes. This task can be done on a potentially un-
trusted server. Consider a sample dataset which contains data
collected from the social media website Twitter. The data is
stored as a tuple that contains a timestamp, unique Twitter
identification number (TweetID), and value. A common task
is to find the most common words that exist within the same
tweet as a term of interest, say t1.
CMD can determine the unique TweetIDs by multiplying
the masked version of the dataset Amasktext (abbreviated
as Amt) to yield an output associative array Cmasktext (ab-
breviated as Cmt):
Cmt = Amt(:,Mask(t1))’ * Amt
Suppose that the term of interest is the word happy,
which is stored using the D4M schema as word|happy.
The above product on the Amt yields the following result:
Unmasking Cmasktext reveals words correlated with
word|happy:
Cpt=Unmask(Cmt,’DET’,’DET’,’RND’)
The second signal processing kernel currently supported
is thresholding. Thresholding keeps all values that satisfy a
certain criteria and discards the rest. In the example above,
we may perform a thresholding to find only common values.
For example:
Cpt=Unmask(Cmt>20,’DET’,’DET’,’RND’)
Fig. 4: Performance of different masking levels in performing
a correlation of two arrays with varying number of elements
5. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
This section describes the performance of the CMD system
on varying sizes of input data to quantify the relative per-
formance overhead incurred by performing computation on
masked data. For these examples, data is stored in an Apache
Accumulo NoSQL database and computation and data re-
trieval times are presented. One key metric for CMD is the
performance overhead incurred with computation on masked
data. Figure 4 describes the time taken to compute a correla-
tion of two associative arrays with varying number of entities.
As the performance chart shows, the computational overhead
involved with using either DET or OPE modes of encryption
is minimal (within 2x) when compared to performing com-
putation on the plaintext data (denoted by CLR). Performing
thresholding on masked data incurs almost no overhead.
Figure 5 describes the performance overhead incurred in
querying and unmasking data masked using different levels
of encryption. From this figure, it is clear that the overhead
incurred by using different modes of encryption is similar to
that of correlation (within 2x) when compared to simply re-
trieving plaintext data (denoted by CLR).
Fig. 5: Query and unmask performance time with varying
number of entries
While it is difficult to quantify the reduction in informa-
tion leakage when compared to plaintext data, the description
of leakage in Table 1 shows that the CMD system greatly re-
duces leakage for applications in which leakage of equality
patterns or order are acceptable.
6. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
Data veracity is a growing concern amongst the big data com-
munity. The volume, velocity, and variety, however, pose
large challenges to the development of systems capable of
protecting the privacy of big data. These challenges are es-
pecially evident in organizations that operate large computing
clouds to be shared by heterogeneous organizations often with
varying data policies. The Computing on Masked Data tool
presented in this article can be used in such environments.
One organization that exemplifies such an environment is the
Department of Homeland Security which is especially prone
to such challenges due to their distributed, multi-agency, and
time sensitive nature.
Homeland security agencies are increasingly looking to
cloud solutions in order to make use of key characteristics
such as on-demand self-service, broad-network access, re-
source pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service [2].
Commercial entitites such as Amazon have responded to this
need by providing US based solutions such as the Amazon
GovCloud [14].
The Computing on Masked Data tool described in this ar-
ticle can provide an extra layer of security with minimal im-
pact to performance to individuals or organizations who wish
to make use of cloud computing offerings without completely
trusting the provider. Consider an example in which different
agencies of the DHS wish to maintain a database of security
related data such as agent field reports. In order to ensure
that this data can be accessed by different agencies, perhaps
geographically distributed across the United States, the DHS
may wish to make use of a commercial cloud provider such as
Amazon Web Service (AWS). While offerings such as Gov-
Cloud provide a baseline of security, one may not want to
offload data confidentiality protection to a third party via ser-
vice level agreements and instead make use of cryptographic
protections on the data (thus protecting it from unauthorized
users from the untrusted cloud provider or other cloud ten-
ants). Using CMD, generated field reports can be encrypted
at individual clients and uploaded to the commercial cloud in
encrypted form using the Mask command. Simple computa-
tion such as correlation or thresholding (suppose to correlate
a name across reports from different agencies) can be done
directly in the cloud without compromising the confidential-
ity of requested data. Finally, correlated data can be queried
and returned to an authorized end user who can use the Un-
mask command on the data using a valid key to see the end re-
sult. Of course, there are still challenges associated with such
tools. For example, organizations may need to agree upon the
desired functionality in order to use the same choice of mask-
ing levels. Such a challenge may be overcome using a layered
encryption scheme as described in [10]. Another challenge is
with the efficient management of keys and requires a solution
as proposed in [15].
Homeland security researchers and scientists should be
aware of the increasing value of data in the cloud and de-
termine methods to mitigate the risk associated with unautho-
rized disclosure. In this article, we propose a tool - Com-
puting on Masked Data - that is a high performance NoSQL
database interface that stores data masked by a choice of tech-
niques. The CMD system supports a wide variety of mask-
ing modes and exhibits high performance for common signal
processing kernels such as correlation and thresholding. The
performance and simplicity of the CMD tool make it an ideal
candidate for many applications.
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